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Abstract 
 
This article provides an overview on decentralization in France from three 
distinct conceptual lenses.  It considers decentralisation in France first as 
part of a wider process of state reform, an example of ‘steering at a distance’ 
drawn from a subset of the literature on governance. The second reading is 
of decentralization as part of an iterative process of local and regional 
capacity building. The third reading of decentralization, drawn from 
literature on new regionalism and minority nationalism, tests linkages 
between identity formation and meso-level political institutions. Though 
each hypothesis can draw some support from the evidence presented, the 
article concludes that capacity building captures the dynamic process 
unleashed by decentralisation better than either central state steering or 
identity-based mobilisation. 
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The movement of decentralisation in France has been gathering pace since 
the 1960s, with the landmark reforms of 1982-83 and 2003-4 representing 
staging posts in an ongoing process of incremental change. How best can we 
understand decentralisation in France? Ought we to interpret 
decentralisation as part of a wider process of state reform, as a strengthening 
of local and regional capacity, as a response to new forms of identity 
politics or as some combination of these? Conceptually, the article views 
decentralisation in France through three alternative prisms that we label as 
central steering, capacity building and identity construction. These 
interpretations emerged from a content analysis of around 150 interviews 
with actors of the decentralised policy communities in two French regions 
(Brittany and Nord/Pas-de-Calais) as well as with a smaller number of key 
actors in Paris. 1  Interlocutors repeatedly interpreted decentralisation in 
terms of one (or more) of these three main understandings, each of which is 
also embedded in different academic literatures. Empirically, the article 
draws upon a mix of primary and secondary literature on decentralisation, 
provides insights from extensive interviews, and, in the final section, reports 
the results of a mass survey on decentralisation carried out in the Brittany 
region in 2001.  
 
Our first hypothesis is that decentralisation in France is part of a broader 
programme of state reform, part of a drive by central governors to divest 
themselves of unwanted or inflationary functions. It is an exercise in 
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steering at a distance. The metaphor of steering is drawn from the 
governance literature (Marin and Mayntz, 1991;  Mayntz, 1993; Rhodes, 
1997; Pierre, 2000, Gaudin, 2002), in particular its German version. For 
Mayntz (1993: 11) the metaphor of ‘steering’ refers to ‘the ability of 
political authorities to mould their social environments’. In recent decades 
governments in all European countries have been confronted with a 
weakening capacity to steer society by proposing solutions to the problems 
they have identified. Modern states need to lower expectations of public 
policy action and develop new policy instruments to manage complexity (Le 
Galès and Lascoumbes, 2004). The history of French decentralisation can be 
interpreted as part of a broader effort by the French state to deal with the 
increasing complexity of its charge and to reform itself (Caillose,  2004; 
Crozier, 1992). The state can no longer assume alone the management of 
complexity, if ever it could. ‘Steering at a distance’ refers to one strategy to 
cope with increased complexity: namely, that of delegating difficult 
decisions to lower echelons of public administration.   
 
For some supporters of decentralisation, the state is an ineffective local 
policy-maker because it ignores local knowledge and circumstances. Our 
second hypothesis is that of decentralisation can be explained in terms of 
new forms of local and regional capacity building. Decentralisation is best 
understood in terms of liberating the entrepreneurial energies and political 
capacity of local and regional players. We define capacity in terms of viable 
institutions, embedded inter-institutional relationships, political leadership 
and policy entrepreneurship, asymmetry in policy delivery and the 
 5 
development of local and regional public arenas. Thus defined, capacity is 
broadly derived from the local political leadership and urban governance 
literature (Stone, 1989, Hirst, 1994, John, 2001, Le Galès, 2002 ). Though 
decentralisation is justified in terms of enhancing local and regional 
capacity, it is not in this hypothesis explicitly linked with identity politics.   
 
Our third hypothesis is that decentralisation in France is shaped by new 
forms of identity-based territorial mobilisation. Minority nationalism and 
political regionalism have emerged as powerful forces across Western 
Europe (McEwen and Moreno, 2005). There has been a revival of ethno-
territorial identities and a challenge to the centralist model of the unitary 
state (Keating, Loughlin and Deschouer, 2003 Keating and McGarry, 2001; 
de Winter and Türsan, 1998, Keating, 1998). As local and regional 
communities are imagined in distinctive ways in different places, so the 
pattern in Europe is for an ‘asymmetrical configuration of government and a 
multiplicity of institutional regimes’ (Majone, 2003). Strong identity can be 
translated in political terms by the development of ethno-territorial parties; 
in cultural terms by the dissemination of identity markers such as language, 
in institutional terms by the construction of alternative polity building 
visions or, in its weakest form, by methods of elite accommodation.   
 
Thus designed, the article sets out to evaluate the relative importance of 
state reform, capacity building and territorial identities as explanatory 
variables for understanding decentralisation in France. Conceptualisation is 
essential in order to research the complex research object of French 
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decentralisation. Our dependent variable (‘decentralisation’) is itself a 
compound entity that encompasses actor motivations, institutional and 
policy outputs and political and partisan processes. The framework we 
propose allows explanations to be contextualised according to whether we 
place most importance on the motivations imputed to actors (hypothesis 
one), explanations of institutional and policy outputs (hypothesis two) or 
political and partisan processes (hypothesis three). The main body of the 
article now addresses the arguments for interpreting decentralisation in 
terms of these three alternative approaches. It begins with an introduction to 
the context of French centralisation and decentralisation. 
   
Centralisation and Decentralisation in France 
 
France is traditionally presented as the paradigm of the unitary state. The 
French revolution of 1789 (and its Napoleonic aftermath) swept away 
provincial autonomy and created a sophisticated administrative 
infrastructure throughout the French territory (Dupuy and Thoenig, 1985). 
The deep penetration of the state into civil society remains highly visible in 
France today (Page, 1991, Sharpe, 1993). The traditional French system of 
‘territorial administration’ rested upon the principle of administrative 
uniformity across the nation (Sadran 1992). It recognised the superiority of 
central state interests over those of parties, interest groups and localities. It 
formed part of a hierarchical mode of top-down organisation, whereby 
public policies originated within government departments or administrative 
corps; were implemented in localities by state field agencies and local 
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authorities, and were co-ordinated by the prefect, the representative of the 
French State in the departments.  
 
In practice, centre-periphery relations were much more flexible than this 
model implied, as uncovered in the empirical studies undertaken by 
researchers in the Centre for the Sociology of Organisations (CSO) in the 
1960s and 1970s (Worms, 1966; Crozier and Thoenig, 1975; Grémion, 
1976).  Particularly influential, the ‘cross-regulation’ approach developed by 
Crozier and Thoenig (1975) described relations between local political and 
administrative actors in this state-centric and bureaucratic system. Three 
pillars supported the system. First, national politicians and officials defined 
the rules governing centre-periphery relations.  Second, there was a long-
term dialogue between state officials (notably the prefect) and leading 
notables to allow for adjustments to nationally defined rules to reflect local 
circumstances.  Third, local relationships were limited to a ‘dual elite’ of 
political and administrative actors; there was no place for ‘third parties, 
whether they be economic interests or voluntary associations’ (Duran and 
Thoenig, 1996, p. 588). The principal local relationships in this pattern of 
cross-regulation were between political notables (parliamentarians, mayors, 
departmental councillors) and state officials (either prefects, or officials 
from the ministerial field services). There was an incentive for ambitious 
politicians to accumulate elective offices (cumul des mandats) as office gave 
access to higher levels of authority and consolidated local power bases.  
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The model of cross-regulation applied mainly to rural and small town 
France. Large cities, undertaking cohesive public policies from the early 
twentieth century in some instances, fell outside of the cross-regulation 
model. From the 1960s onwards, the model of cross-regulation became less 
influential in rural areas and small towns as well. During the 1970s, the 
localist case began to be won at the level of ideas (Ohnet, 1996; Boeuf, 
2004) The watershed in the governance of French municipalities occurred in 
1977, when the left captured control of almost three-quarters of large towns. 
Left-run municipalities were not content to engage in traditional lobbying 
practices. Many of the new municipal teams were strongly influenced by the 
ideas of the May ‘68 movement, notably those of self-management and 
social experimentation. A belief in proximity, democratic empowerment, 
citizenship and local self-reliance were thus important facets of a changing 
ideological and policy climate that preceded the institutional reforms of the 
early 1980s. 
 
The French Socialist government’s reforms of 1982-3 were ambitious 
(Boguenard, 2004; Gaudemet and Gohin, 2004; Levy, 2001; Schmidt, 
1990). The reforms both created new institutions (the 22 elected regional 
councils), and greatly enhanced the decision-making powers of existing 
players (the 96 departmental councils and the larger communes). The 
decentralisation reforms recognised local authorities as fully operational 
legal entities freed from a priori prefectoral control. The decision-making 
responsibilities of local and regional actors were increased, with the 
extension of sub-national influence into new policy areas such as social 
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affairs, economic development and education. In most respects, the 
‘departmentalists’ defeated the ‘regionalists’ in 1982-83, as they would 
again in 2003-4. The departments were given larger budgets, more staff and 
more service-delivery responsibilities than the regions. Central government 
preferred to deal with the relatively subservient departments, rather than 
strong regions which might contest its authority.    
 
The 1982 reforms were guided by two rather contradictory principles: that 
types of decision should be attributed to specific ‘levels’ of public 
administration (communal, departmental, regional); but that all authorities 
should be free to develop policies in areas they deemed to be important for 
their constituents (Fonrojet, 2004). The first of these principles enshrined 
the so-called ‘blocs de compétences’, signifying particular responsibilities 
carried out by the different levels. As a general rule, matters of immediate 
proximity (low-level social assistance, administrative port of first call, 
planning permission, waste) are the preserve of the communes and the 
various inter-communal bodies –SIVU2, SIVOM3, EPCI4 -   to which they 
delegate authority. Matters of intermediate proximity are the policy province 
of the 96 departmental councils, which manage large budgets and are major 
service delivery agencies (in social assistance, some intermediate education, 
social services, roads and the minimal income [RMA]). Matters deemed to 
be strategic are, in theory, the preserve of the regional councils: economic 
development, vocational training, infrastructure, some secondary education, 
some transport (and regional rail services since 2002), with additional 
responsibilities in culture, the environment and health. The second principle 
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– that of the ‘free administration of local authorities’ – cuts across the 
apparent clarity of the first. In practice, the various sub-national authorities 
have overlapping territorial jurisdictions and loosely defined spheres of 
competence. Moreover, there is no formal hierarchy between them. No 
single authority can impose its will on any other, or prevent a rival authority 
from adopting policies in competition with its own. Unlike in federal 
systems, the French regions do not exercise leadership over other local 
authorities; if anything, the French regions are dependent upon the co-
operation of lower-level authorities – the departments in particular – for the 
successful implementation of their own policies. The various levels of sub-
national government are presented in Table 1. 
 
---- Table 1 around here ---- 
 
After its revision in March 2003, the French constitution now recognises 
four levels of local authority: the commune, the department, the region 
(new) and those with a ‘special statute’ (new).  ‘Who does what’ is arguably 
not the most interesting question. French sub-national governance rests 
upon a complex actor system, whereby policy is managed by plural actors 
with overlapping responsibilities at several levels. Complex actor systems 
produce interdependent relationships, rather than clear-cut transfers of 
responsibilities. This interdependency can legitimately give rise to 
contrasting interpretations of decentralisation, three of which we now 
consider.  
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Decentralisation as Steering at a distance?  
 
If the cross-regulation model applied principally to the pre-Second World 
War period, the first thirty years of the post-war period were those of 
technocratic modernisation. The ‘orthodox’ account of French public policy, 
developed principally by Jobert and Muller in L’Etat en action (1987) 
describes determined central state action, uncovers the existence of tight 
policy communities located within the state and diagnoses a specific form of 
French state corporatism. This state-centric model had important 
ramifications for territorial public policy-making. Modernising state 
planners piloted most significant public policies in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Lorrain 1991). The French state combined various forms of direct and 
indirect control over territorial planning (aménagement du territoire).  In a 
direct sense, central actors determined territorial planning priorities and 
ensured a steady flow of financial resources to fund centrally defined 
projects5. Territorial planning activities were above all the policy province 
of the bridges and highways (ponts-et-chaussées) corps that controlled the 
engineers working in the Infrastructure ministry (Thoenig 1973). Indirect 
methods of control of central government were even more effective. 
Adopting a standard-setting role, central actors dictated technical norms in 
housing, road building and infrastructure6. The state could rely on a network 
of state field services and agencies to implement its will in French localities. 
The most significant of these were the Caisse des dépôts et de 
consignations, the state lending bank that controlled most finance;  the 
Directions départementales d’Equipment (DDE), the departmentally-based 
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field services of the Equipment ministry and the DATAR. The DATAR was 
created in 1963 as a central state agency ‘to accompany the development of 
the French desert around Paris’ 7 through making strategic investments in 
economic development. It remains a key player in the process of central 
steering, as demonstrated by its lead role in the competitive clusters (‘pôles 
de compétitivité’) programme of the Villepin government. 
 
The top-down model was (initially) distrustful of local, regional or even 
administrative decentralisation. The gradual empowerment of a meso-level 
of public administration in the late 1950s and early 1960s reflected the 
inability of the central state to achieve its objectives alone. Regional 
structures were created as technocratic outposts of the French state, to assist 
in strategic functions of economic development, transport and territorial 
planning. The regional administrative constituencies (conférences 
administratives régionales - CAR) set up in 1955 were the precursors of  the 
first regional councils (établissements publics régionaux - EPR) created in 
1972 (Ohnet, 1996; Dumont, 2005). In time, these nominated bodies 
became directly elected levels of sub-national government from 1986 
onwards. Administrative decentralisation (‘deconcentration’) preceded 
political decentralisation by two decades, however. The creation of the 
regional prefectures in 1964 marked the first significant regionalisation of 
state structures. Rather like the regional councils later, the regional 
prefectures were light, strategic bodies that could coordinate the activities of 
the much weightier departmental prefectures.  
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Once decentralisation had been implemented in the early 1980s, central 
government began to change the mode of its intervention in French 
localities and regions.  In the early years after 1982, decentralisation was 
experienced as a loss of prestige by certain state corps (highways and 
bridges, notably)8. Bringing the State back in the governance of French 
localities and regions was achieved by the State-Region plans, introduced in 
the 1982 decentralisation law (Gaudin, 1999; Pasquier, 2004; Pontier, 
1998). Under the terms of the 1982 law, the regional council first draws up a 
regional plan and then negotiates with the State-in-Region, represented by 
the regional prefecture. One interpretation of State-Region planning is as a 
new form of central steering, with the infrastructure of the regional 
prefectures used to direct regional policy choices. Through the State-Region 
plans, the central state has been able to impose some its own priorities on 
the regions, in the fields of higher education9 and transport10 notably. For a 
number of interlocutors in the French regions, the State-region plans are a 
means for central government to mobilize the financial resources of local 
and regional government in the pursuit of its own objectives. The sums of 
money involved in the State-Region plans are considerable. Henceforth, a 
proportion of the regional budget ranging from 15-25% (according to 
region) is devoted to ongoing items, co-financed by the regions, the state 
and the European Union (EU), that do not fall within the region’s legal 
responsibilities (Pasquier, 2004). Regional council ownership of the plans is 
limited by the fact that all plans have to be agreed by the Inter-ministerial 
Territorial Planning Committee (Comité interministeriel de l’aménagement 
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et du développement du territoire - CIADT), a structure attached to the 
Prime Minister’s office from which the regional Presidents are excluded. 
 
State-Region plans can not, however, be reduced to crude central steering. 
Through its use of contracts, the French state has begun to operate in a more 
flexible manner in an attempt to mobilise resources beyond its control 
(Richter, 2004, Gaudin, 1999, 2002). Contractual procedures are inherently 
unstable and they can produce outcomes that are variable across the national 
territory11. They involve negotiation between partners with the status of 
formal equals and the departmental and regional councils can refuse to agree 
to the State’s demands. 12 Rather than crude central steering, meso-level 
governance in contemporary France is characterised by more interdependent 
forms of policy-making and above all by the importance of contractual 
processes – such as State-Region plans, the City Contracts, Higher 
Education contracts, or security contracts  - that have produced differential 
outcomes across France.  
 
We defined steering at a distance as the top-down impulse of delegating 
difficult decisions to lower echelons of public administration. Nowhere was 
this rationale more apparent than in the 2004 Decentralisation Act. An 
internal circular within the Prime Minister’s office that accompanied the 
publication of the proposition de loi in December 2002 referred to those 
areas to be transferred as those which were ‘technically and socially the 
most difficult’. 13 Deep suspicions of central government motives were 
raised in interviews in the summer of 2002 concerning the future reform14. 
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As the decentralisation debates unfolded in 2003/4, opposition hardened to 
the transfer of functions and personnel, particularly in the sensitive areas of 
educational and health staff. 
 
The core of the ‘steering at a distance’ claim lies in the financial 
disengagement of the state. The sentiment was repeatedly expressed in 
interviews in 2002 that functions must not be decentralised without 
complete financial compensation. The 2003 Constitutional Reform and the 
2004 Decentralisation Act contained rather conflicting provisions for local 
government finances. The reformed constitution now embeds the principle 
of the financial autonomy of local authorities (Ba, 2004; Connétable, 2004). 
The constitution now affirms that the principle of ‘free administration’ 
requires local and regional authorities to be responsible for raising the 
‘overwhelming proportion’ of their revenues in local taxation.  The 
provision implies that local and regional authorities would be given far 
greater tax-raising powers, able to vary, within limits, local taxation. This 
provision raised much opposition on behalf of local and regional politicians. 
The tax-raising power, welcome in principle, would force local politicians to 
raise taxes in order to run unpopular services. The main fear was that 
financial transfers from central government would be reduced accordingly 
(Sueur, 2005).  
 
Decentralisation as ‘steering at a distance’ has a powerful resonance. The 
delegation of new service delivery responsibilities forms part of a broader 
process of state reform, the perennial preoccupation of policy-makers in 
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France. In the debate on local finances, there were echoes of British-style 
new public management, insofar as government ministers welcome the 
prospect that local financial accountability would be enhanced. Steering at a 
distance was not in the least a federal conception. Services would be 
delivered at a regional, departmental or local level in ways that were closely 
regulated and defined by the central state.  
 
Decentralisation as local and regional capacity building? 
 
Our second hypothesis we label as local and regional capacity building. 
Political scientists understand capacity in a variety of ways (Gambetta, 
1988; Stone, 1989;  John, 2001; Pasquier, 2004). Capacity can be 
interpreted in a top down sense, in terms of the resources that localities, 
departments or regions need to possess in order to conform to government 
or EU directives or to implement policies. In unitary states especially, the 
implementation capacity of local authorities is a constant preoccupation of 
central government. Capacity can also be understood in a more 
constructivist way in terms of the internal qualities of localities and regions, 
their visions of the future and perception of their role. We argue that 
innovation in France’s regions and localities has been driven by the 
emergence of more cohesive local government structures, the strengthening 
of local political leadership, the development of more entrepreneurial forms 
of policy-making, the generalization of new forms of asymmetrical policy 
delivery, the growth of sub-national expertise and influence in European 
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affairs and the emergence of new local and regional public spheres as arenas 
for collective action. 
 
More cohesive local government structures provide support for capacity 
building. French sub-national governance has traditionally been 
characterised by resource-based competition between overlapping layers of 
public administration: the 36500 communes, 2000 or so inter-communal 
bodies, 96 departments and 22 regions in mainland France. This institutional 
diversity is made even more complex by the penetration of the central 
state’s ministerial field services into the smallest French towns. This pattern 
of public administration has had many zero-sum qualities: as embodied in 
damaging tax competition between communes, overlapping and competitive 
modes of service delivery between layers of local government and 
institutional turf wars between local authorities and state field services15.  
 
More cohesive local government structures have developed in recent years. 
They are rooted in urban governance and processes of metropolitanisation 
(Ascher, 1998; Le Galès, 2002). In France’s urban areas, successive laws 
and regulations since the 1960s have attempted to adapt local government 
structures to take account of sociological and demographic change. While 
large cities typically contain 30-80 communes, public policy problems do 
not respect such small communal boundaries. There has been a growing 
impetus behind the development of city-wide local government structures as 
a tool for tackling problems of urban governance. The most complex of 
these city-wide inter-communal structures are the urban communities, 
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created in 1968, that administer many of the traditional communal functions 
in France’s largest cities, such as Lyons, Marseilles and Lille. Reforms in 
the 1990s sought to strengthen further city governments, particularly 
through developing the inter-communal public corporations (Établissements 
publics de co-operation intercommunal - EPCI) (Marcou, 2004; Boeuf, 
2004b). Most medium-sized and large cities are now administered by these 
(indirectly elected) public corporations which are vested with tax-varying 
and service delivery powers. The technical expertise of these city 
governments has greatly improved due to the rise of urban development 
agencies, bodies staffed by planning experts, economists and urban 
geographers16. Such agencies have reduced the reliance on state field 
services, especially those of the Infrastructure ministry.  
 
Interconnectivity provides a variation on the theme of meso-level capacity. 
Local and regional authorities need to develop efficient horizontal and 
vertical relationships - or at least to avoid damaging zero-sum disputes -  if 
there are to carry out their minimal duties. Good relationships are required 
to make the institutions of French sub-national governance function 
effectively. Relationships between levels of meso-level governance (local, 
departmental, regional) are not necessarily played out as a zero-sum game. 
The ability of a regional council, for example, to articulate an overarching 
territorial vision might be enhanced by strengthening inter-communal 
collaboration. Inter-communal structures, usually based on employment or 
training zones that are substantially larger than traditional communal 
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boundaries, are generally consistent with the region’s own planning on a 
sub-regional level.  
 
The state of inter-institutional linkages varies in accordance with local and 
regional circumstances. Empirical investigation we carried out in two 
French regions revealed very contrasting patterns (Cole, 2006, Cole and 
John, 2001). The Brittany region stands out for its high level of cross-
communal co-operation, not only in urban centres such as Rennes, but in the 
rural hinterland as well.  Brittany scores highly in terms of institutional 
inter-connectivity, embodied by established traditions of inter-communal 
co-operation and normally harmonious relationships between regional 
politicians and representatives of the state field services.  In Nord/Pas-de-
Calais, on the other hand, a long tradition of urban rivalry, fractious state-
region relationships and poor relationships between local politicians and 
business actors traditionally produced sub-optimal local outcomes.  
 
More cohesive local government structures have encouraged stronger local 
political leadership, another key dimension of capacity building (John and 
Cole, 1999). City case studies have long demonstrated the importance not 
only of the local environment in shaping the character of local political 
leadership, but also of the ability of local leaders to shape their 
environments (Lagroye, 1973; Biarez, 1989; Phlipponeau, 1977; Borraz, 
1998).  The local government route can produce political leaders of 
international reputations, such as Bertrand Delanöe in Paris. The mayoral 
office, rather than the presidency of a departmental or a regional council, 
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continues to be the most coveted amongst politicians with a base in local 
government. Decentralisation enhanced the power of urban mayors by 
loosening tight state controls on their financial capacity and by increasing 
their legal and political scope for innovation (Faure, 1991, Lorrain, 1991, 
Lorrain 1993, Borraz, 1998). Successful mayors have become more 
entrepreneurial. Across France, mayors have also placed themselves at the 
head of new-style development coalitions, mobilising large-scale public and 
private resources for ambitious development projects (Le Galès, 1995). 
 
On the other hand, the more composite environment produced by 
decentralisation has made the mayoral function far more complex. 
Specialisation has diversified the structures of local power. With 
decentralisation, the mayor’s executive officers (‘adjoints’) have become 
central actors (Borraz, 1998). As local authorities have developed their policy 
capacities, the adjoints have become real specialists in their chosen areas, 
enabling them to engage in a dialogue of equals with technical experts and 
representatives of local pressure groups. Whereas local interactions would 
previously be limited to those between of mayors and prefects, local networks 
have become much broader, to encompass mayors and their adjoints, 
representative of local economic power (chambers, employers’ associations, 
individual business people), voluntary associations and public-private 
partnerships (mixed economy societies) (Gaudin, 1995; Gaudin, 1999; Le 
Galès 1995; Cole and John, 1995). Local power has become more complex, 
and the successful mayors are those powerful enough to pull the shifting 
framework together.  
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Local and regional authorities have become more entrepreneurial, a third 
key dimension of capacity building. Joint venture companies (known as 
‘mixed economy societies’) have allowed local (and in some cases regional) 
authorities to launch ambitious development projects part-financed by 
private capital.17 Such joint ventures are not new, tracing their history back 
to 1926, but decentralisation loosened considerably the administrative 
constraints conditioning their operation. As mixed economy societies are 
subject to civil, rather than to administrative law, they are much more 
flexible than local authorities themselves. Joint ventures have been used for 
purposes of transport, museums, theatres, sporting facilities, tourism, 
conference centres, even hotel chains (Ascher 1998, Heinz, 1994,  Lorrain 
1991, Lorrain, 1993 ). At their most ambitious, mixed economy societies 
have acted as a conduit for large-scale foreign direct investment into French 
localities. Mixed economy societies have facilitated the introduction of 
private sector management techniques (such as the freedom to recruit part-
time and temporary workers and more flexible accounting practices) while 
retaining overall public sector control of joint ventures. 
 
Arguably the most significant feature of France’s local and regional 
governance is the new reality of asymmetrical variation. Even before the 
2003 constitutional reform, there were many ways in which outcomes could 
vary across the country. The principle of ‘free administration’ presupposes 
that local and regional authorities can choose their domains of policy 
intervention (subject to their legal duty to administer certain services). Local 
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and regional authorities can determine how they are organised internally, 
what rates of local taxation they levy (within strict limits), how they 
organise service delivery (whether they contract services out to private firms 
for example). The creation after 1999 of powerful inter-communal 
authorities across France has increased the diversity of local practices 
beyond that previously ensured by the principle of ‘free administration’ 
(Boeuf, 2004b). Within limits, the EPCI are free to negotiate which policy 
responsibilities are transferred up to the supra-communal body and which 
remain with individual communes.  In small town and rural areas, the pays 
are potentially even more innovative; these inter-communal bodies are 
based on specific local projects, which can involve experimental transfers of 
authority (Portier, 2003).  
 
The 2003 constitutional reform and the 2004 Decentralisation Act introduce 
two new ways in which outcomes can vary across the country: the special 
statute authorities and ‘experimentation’. The special statute clause covers 
the various types of inter-communal bodies (EPCI). It also refers to the 
merging of existing sub-national authorities into larger units, potentially a 
radical break with the past. Two separate mechanisms for institutional 
adjustment are envisaged in the reformed 2003 constitution; agreement 
between the elected representatives of two or more local authorities or 
popular assent through local referendums (Connétable, 2004). These 
provisions might one day produce varying institutional outcomes across 
France, on condition they are approved by the French parliament. Aside 
from pleas for the unification of historic regions such as Brittany, 
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Normandy, Savoy and Corsica, there were also arguments, notably by 
former President Giscard d’Estaing, for the creation of a few large regions 
to be comparable with German länder. In July 2003, however, voters in 
Corsica narrowly rejected in a referendum the proposition that a single 
regional authority should replace the existing Haut-Corse and Corse-Sud 
departments. A further reversal occurred in December 2003, when voters in 
Guadeloupe and Martinique rejected plans for more autonomy. To all 
extents and purposes, the special statute clause looked dead and buried.  
 
The 2003 constitutional reform also introduced the possibility for the 
‘experimental transfer of functions’, both across different levels of the 
French State and from the State to sub-national authorities. Experimentation 
needs to be understood on two levels: as an internal process of state reform 
and as an empowering of local and regional authorities.  In terms of the 
organisation of the French State, the reform allows for more administrative 
decentralisation (Chavrier, 2004). Article 37/1 allows central ministries to 
transfer new functions to their territorial field services, coming close to 
admitting subsidiarity as a principle of the organisation of the State. Article 
72 deals with transfers from the State to sub-national authorities. Any sub-
national authority can now bid to exercise responsibilities in areas such as 
training, roads or airports that were previously in the policy domain of the 
central state or other public authorities such as the chambers of commerce. 
Not only can local and regional authorities bid to run new functions, they 
can also derogate themselves from providing services on a case by case 
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basis. These two articles (37/1 and 72) create the potential for expanding 
asymmetry between local authorities and within the French State.  
 
The European dimension provides some further evidence of capacity 
building. Here is not the place to revisit the theory of multi-level governance 
that, whatever its merits, arguably places excessive importance on the 
linkages between the third (subnational) and first (supranational) levels 
(Majone, 2003; Smith, 1997). France has traditionally had one of the 
tightest, most state-centric forms of interaction with Brussels (Bulmer and 
Lequesne, 2005; Eymeri, 2003). At an official inter-governmental level, all 
interactions are supposed to be cleared by the SGCI, a bureaucratic unit 
attached to the Prime Minister’s office. Another central state agency 
dependent upon the Prime Minister, the DATAR, co-ordinates local and 
regional bids for funding, in close liaison with the regional prefectures, the 
SGAR.  In practice, bound by EU rules, the regional prefectures have 
associated the regional councils (especially) with the definition and the 
implementation of structural funds18. Since the passage of the 2004 
decentralisation law, indeed, French regions have been allowed to bid to 
exercise complete control over the management of structural funds on an 
experimental basis (the first being Alsace). The direction of change is clear, 
even though French administrative and political elites continue to resist this 
development. 
 
The French State context notwithstanding, there has been some development of local 
and regional capacity in the European sphere. The 1982 Act allowed French local and 
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regional authorities to set up offices in Brussels. Where they exist (as in the case 
Brittany/Pays de la Loire) these offices perform a restricted role, limited to 
information gathering, anticipation of future developments and organising meetings 
for local and regional politicians with the relevant officials from the Commission19.  
Unlike their counterparts in some countries, French sub-national offices have no 
access to diplomatic papers or officials. Local or regional politicians are not present in 
the Council working groups, nor do they represent France in intergovernmental 
committee structures (as the devolved authorities can do in the UK). The 
representation of France in Brussels remains, in comparative terms, a state-centric 
affair. If the institutional avenues for formal expression are modest, however, 
interviews uncovered a rich stream of more covert forms of influence.20 
 
The above survey suggests that the logics of decentralisation are variable. In 
some areas, strong regional authorities have emerged as strategic co-
ordinators and lead authorities; in others, powerful city governments are 
more innovative and influential than distant regions or subservient 
departments. In still others (especially rural and small town areas) central 
state-departmental alliances have continued relatively undisturbed. Taken 
together, however, these various dimensions of sub-national capacity 
building present a powerful counterweight to technocratic central steering as 
an explanation of the institutional and policy outcomes of decentralisation. 
We can summarise the development of capacity in terms of the growth of 
local and regional public spheres (François and Neveu, 1999; Cole and 
John, 1995; Cole, 1997). By local and regional public spheres are signified 
arenas within which a plurality of organisations interacts: local and regional 
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authorities, regional prefectures, the field services of central ministries, 
firms, associations and to lesser extent social partners. These arenas can 
contribute to developing local and regional capacity to the extent they can 
mobilise coherent territorial policy networks. The examples of Brittany and 
the Nord/Pas-de-Calais presented above illustrate that there is no iron law 
equating decentralised political institutions and the mobilisation of 
territorialized policy communities. But decentralisation has provided new 
institutional channels through which political, economic, associative and 
administrative actors can interact.  
 
Decentralisation and identity construction  
 
Our third hypothesis is that decentralisation in France is shaped by new 
forms of identity-based territorial mobilisation. The heart of the minority 
nationalist/new regionalist argument is that almost everywhere there has 
been a revival of ethno-territorial identities and a challenge to the centralist 
model of the unitary state (de Winter, 1998, Keating, 1998, Loughlin, 2001, 
Moreno, 2005). Ethno-territorial identities reflect themselves in different 
party systems, language rights movements, cultural traditions or specific 
forms of elite accommodation. These arguments were developed to 
understand the union states of the United Kingdom and Spain, and later 
adapted to Belgium, Germany or Italy. Research into compound identities is 
much rarer in France. In the mainstream French Republican tradition, 
territorial (especially regional) or ethnic identities are considered a threat to 
a neutral public sphere that can alone guarantee political and civil rights 
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(Raymond, 2006). Researchers working in this area face numerous obstacles, 
as France does not allow the collection of statistical data on the basis of 
‘ethnic’ or linguistic criteria, only those of nationality (Reverchon, 2005). In 
the one and indivisible Republic, there can only be one identity and one 
language.21 
 
Our intuitive response is to reject the identity construction hypothesis. The 
examples of territorial asymmetry we explored above were linked to 
efficient service delivery, or to political entrepreneurship, not to identity 
politics.  More robust attempts at introducing new forms of asymmetrical 
devolution in France have run against serious obstacles. The Matignon 
process undertaken by the Jospin government in 2001 was a bold attempt to 
introduce the principle of legislative asymmetry. This aborted process had 
envisaged transferring regulatory, then legislative powers to the Corsican 
Assembly, until the Council of State objected and the Constitutional Council 
ruled the process unconstitutional. Given its reaction to the Corsican 
example, it is highly likely that any attempt to derogate too seriously from 
the norm of uniformity will be resisted by the Council of State, the guardian 
of France’s conservative public law tradition.  
 
The French republican model emphasises formal equality and individual 
rights, rather than territorial equity and group identities (Levy, Cole and Le 
Galès, 2005). The history of regionalisation in France bears the imprint of 
the centralising French republican tradition. French regions were imagined 
as institutions without a link to territory (Balme, 1999, Nay, 1997, Pasquier, 
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2004, Zeller and Stussi, 2004). They were created in a standardised form 
throughout France, including in areas where no regional tradition existed. 
With the partial exception of Brittany and Corsica, France’s historic regions 
and communities do not enjoy institutional expression. The Basque 
movement has so far failed in its minimal demand for a Basque department. 
There is a small electoral clientele for regionalism in Alsace, Savoy, 
Brittany, Normandy, the Basque country and French Catalonia. Regionalist 
or autonomist parties have occasionally elected representatives to local and 
regional councils, but they have found it difficult to operate independently 
of the main French parties (Ruane, Todd and Mandeville, 2003, Charette, 
2005).    
 
On the other hand, strong cultural, language and territorial defence 
movements have emerged since the 1970s (Cole and Williams, 2004). New 
forms of collective mobilisation have raised the status of the Breton, 
Occitan or Basque languages. Cultural regionalism has emerged as a 
powerful force in Brittany, the Basque country and Alsace, and to a lesser 
extent in Savoy, Normandy, Occitania, Flanders and French Catalonia 
(Chartier and Larvor, 2004). There has been a revival of regional cultural 
traditions, languages and historic identities.  
 
The official resistance to recognising compound identities makes the French 
case an interesting one. For Moreno himself (2006), France provides the 
counter-example, the one case where the unitary state tradition has repressed 
particularistic identities and where there is a lack of correspondence 
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between territorial units and ‘natural’ identity communities.  If compound 
identities feed into institution-building anywhere on the French mainland, 
they are likely to do so in Brittany, which we identify from the existing 
literature as the region in mainland France with the most distinctive sense of 
its own identity (Ford, 1993, Le Coadic, 1998, MacDonald, 1989, Nicolas, 
1986, Pasquier, 2004). In theory, Brittany possesses key features identified 
by Moreno to develop an ‘ethno-territorial’ identity: a pre-state political 
existence22, an autonomist Breton political movement; a language rights 
movement, strong cultural traditions and specific forms of elite 
accommodation. Brittany is also one of the few regions where political 
institutions refer to a distinctive political region. 23 There is a complex 
pattern of multiple Breton identities and a willingness to envisage more 
advanced forms of political decentralisation than elsewhere in France (Le 
Coadic, 1998, Pillet, 2001). Brittany therefore provides a robust case for 
testing the importance and limitations of the relationship between territorial 
identities and political institutions; and for pinning down the sources of 
support for regional political institutions.  
 
To investigate further a polling organisation was commissioned to carry out 
a survey in June 200124. Findings will now be presented relating to 
compound identities and institutional preferences and a number of 
deductions will be made about regional/ethno-territorial politics and the 
political opportunity structure. We measured identity by using the Moreno 
scale, which asked respondents to situate themselves along a five-point 
continuum (‘Breton, not French, ‘more Breton than French, ‘As Breton as 
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French, ‘More French than Breton, ‘French, not Breton’), providing insights 
into their preferential mix of regional and national identities. The results of 
the Moreno question in Brittany are presented in Table 2. 
 
---Table 2 around here --- 
 
Brittany has the optimum identity spread:  a powerful sense of territorial 
identity, which is easily accommodated within the framework of the existing 
French state. There is little perceived conflict between being Breton and 
being French: the median position (‘As Breton as French’) being the 
overwhelming favourite. On the other hand, our findings explode the myth 
that there is only one French identity: three-quarters of the survey declared 
themselves to feel at least as Breton as French. These findings back up the 
common perception that Brittany is a ‘strong identity’ region. Though the 
sense of regional identity is strong, however, this is not considered as being 
in opposition to an overarching French nationhood.  
 
Brittany is also the birthplace of the idea of regional political institutions in 
France (Pasquier, 2004). The survey captured institutional preferences for 
the future in Brittany that are presented in Table 3.  It reveals a strong 
demand in Brittany for consolidating or strengthening existing regional 
institutions, with a firm foundation of support for more enhanced forms of 
regional governance. Cross-tabulations demonstrate a convergence towards 
the median identity position  - ‘As Breton as French’ -   and support for 
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either retaining the existing regional institutions, or moving towards a more 
powerful regional body with legislative and tax varying powers 25.  
 
---Table 3 around here --- 
 
What variables came into play when supporting these varying degrees of 
political autonomy?  To obtain answers, we undertook logistic regression, 
with a view to elucidating differing attitudes to the hypothetical situations of 
political independence, full legislative devolution, limited devolution and 
opposition to any form of regional political institution. 26  A number of 
independent variables were identified, such as age, gender, education and 
place of birth. The attitudinal and opinion variables of identity, aptitude in 
the Breton languages, preferred level of decision for policies and intended 
voting behaviour in a regional and general election were also included. 
Table 4 provides the logistic regression estimates for Brittany.  
 
-Table 4 around here – 
 
A number of conclusions emerge. There is a significant relationship 
between the intensity of feelings of identity and support for independence 
(the small proportion of the Breton, not French group being much more 
favourable to independence than any other). But the small numbers of 
respondents failing into this category urges caution. Other identity markers 
are less obviously correlated with support for political autonomy or 
enhanced decentralisation. Counter-intuitively, there is a negative 
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relationship between Breton language competency and support for 
independence or for enhanced forms of devolution. This finding backs up 
the traditional literature in the field, emphasising a lingering sense of shame 
and inferiority amongst native Breton speakers (almost by definition in the 
oldest age categories) and an over-compensation of loyalty to France and 
the French state (Hoare, 2000).  
 
Moreno identifies the other identity markers for stateless nations as those of 
political movements, cultural movements and elite accommodation. Support 
for decentralisation in Brittany is not a function of a powerful nationalist 
party. Though Brittany has a rich variety of small nationalist political 
organisations, political nationalism in Brittany has been a marginal political 
(as opposed to cultural) force and has exercised little agenda-setting 
influence. The main Breton ‘ethnic-territorial’ party, the Breton Democratic 
Union (Union démocratique bretonne - UDB), has a real but limited 
presence. The Breton cultural movement has been very powerful, on the 
other hand, performing an agenda setting role in matters of bilingual 
education, cultural investment, the environment and the regional media. Our 
survey uncovered broad public support for measures to assist the Breton 
cultural movement, with strong majorities agreeing that Breton-medium 
cultural associations and media should be part-financed from public funds.  
There is clearly a latent Breton consciousness, kept alive by a dense network 
of cultural associations that might, in other circumstances, provide the basis 
for a distinctive ethno-territorial party. 27 
 
 33 
This latent Breton consciousness is not a political resource that can be 
mobilised by any of the existing regionalist or nationalist parties such as the 
UDB (Cole, 2006b). The political and discursive opportunity structures in 
contemporary France are forbidding for explicit ethno-territorial politics or 
parties. Breton influence manifests itself most effectively at the level of elite 
accommodation. Brittany is a region with a strong identity, whose elites 
have become accustomed to operating in the broader French State (and 
European Union) context. As a region, Brittany is replete with paradoxes. 
There is a widespread demand for more powerful regional political 
institutions within public opinion, and an even stronger demand amongst 
regional politicians. But Breton regional politicians also occupy important 
positions within all the leading French parties. In the real world of French 
politics, Breton politicians concentrate their primary efforts on Paris. An 
element of ambiguity is calculated to serve Brittany’s interests. Playing up 
Breton identity encourages the central state to channel scarce resources to its 
peripheral region. Brittany’s political elite has thus adapted to the French 
logic of territorial decentralisation, while framing political interactions at 
least in part in regional terms. Breton political capacity is real, but it is only 
partially articulated through the regional political institution created by the 
1982 Decentralisation Act. The institutional and political structures of 
opportunities have emphasised the conquest of national (French) power, and 
this has only partially been called into question with decentralisation.   
 
Discussion and conclusions 
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The article set out to evaluate the relative importance of state reform, local 
and regional capacity building and territorial identities as explanatory 
variables for understanding decentralisation in France. The first conclusion 
is that decentralisation in France needs to be read at different levels: in 
terms of actor motivations, institutional and policy outputs and political and 
partisan processes. The hypothesis of steering at a distance captures well the 
motivations of key central state actors and the perceptions of these 
motivations from those operating at the micro- and meso-level.  The 
capacity building hypothesis has less to say about motivations, but rather 
more about institutional and policy outcomes, and captures the iterative 
processes at work in local and regional capacity building. The identity 
construction hypothesis elucidates how ethno-territorial political processes 
can, in certain circumstances, impact upon the functioning of devolved 
political institutions. 
 
Each hypothesis can draw some support from the evidence presented.  The 
third hypothesis - that decentralisation in France is shaped by new forms of 
identity-based territorial mobilisation - is the weakest. Political movements 
based on territorial identity do exist in France, but they have been 
unsuccessful in shaping institutional responses, except arguably in Corsica. 
Even in a strong identity region such as Brittany, regional advocacy has 
been promoted through the existing French political parties, rather than by 
nationalist or regionalist alternatives (Cole and Loughlin, 2003). Though a 
distinctive form of sub-national governance has evolved in France, its 
precise form has been shaped by the opportunities provided and constraints 
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imposed by the unitary state form. Unitary states can accommodate 
pragmatic policy differentiation, hence the move to a French-style local and 
regional governance since the early 1980s. But they allow much less scope 
for the construction of autonomous territorial-institutional futures than in 
union states, such as the United Kingdom and Spain, or in federations such 
as Belgium.  
 
Our first hypothesis - that of steering at a distance – is very seductive.  Writers 
such as Sadran (1992) and Mabileau (1997) argue convincingly that contractual 
processes and partnerships are consistent with French top-down administrative 
traditions, whereby the state gives a lead, but relies on local authorities and 
other partners  to finance and implement policy programmes. The central state 
intervenes directly in territorial management in the form of steering the State-
Region and other public policy contracts. The French State retains enormous 
regulatory and fiscal powers and remains deeply involved in local and regional 
affairs. From the perspective of the central state, political and administrative 
decentralisation can produce beneficial fiscal and functional effects, improve 
public policies and shift blame. Shedding inflationary social assistance 
policies, for example, can allow more strategic thinking at the centre and 
offload tax increases onto local authorities. It is quite possible to interpret the 
decentralisation reforms of the 1982-83 and 2003-04 as little more than a by-
product of the perennial effort to reform the state.  
 
Rather than crude central steering, however, the article has contended that 
meso-level governance in contemporary France is characterised by more 
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interdependent forms of policy-making. The local and regional governance 
literature, with its disparate focus upon public–private synergies, multi-
level interactions, territoriality, experimentation and organisational 
decentralisation, best captures the complexity uncovered throughout the 
article (Le Galès, 2002, Loughlin, 2001, John, 2001, Pierre, 2000, Gaudin, 
1999, 2002). We do not embrace the multi-level governance approach per 
se, but the article has presented some evidence that local and regional 
players are focussing upon new institutional arenas and building novel 
trans-national relationships to by-pass tight state controls. In most respects, 
however, the EU system of governance is based around supranational 
institutions and member-states, not the territorial substrata thereof.  
 
In defence of the second hypothesis, decentralisation must be read as a 
process, not a single event. Local and regional capacity building has both an 
iterative and a cognitive dimension. Local and regional authorities have 
become entrepreneurial as they have gained experience and confidence.  
Local and regional authorities have learnt from their own past errors, as well 
as from comparing their own experiences in policy fields such as education, 
welfare and transport. Interviewees repeatedly referred to the emulative 
effect produced by decentralisation, as sub-national authorities attempt to 
build better schools or improve the economic attractiveness of their 
localities, departments or regions. Our preferred second hypothesis does not 
facilitate drawing neat conclusions that are equally valid across the country. 
The weight of local and regional variables depends upon precise 
configurations that vary across France. Political arrangements must be 
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understood within the context of local (and sometimes regional) political 
traditions, social dynamics and economic change.  On balance, however, 
such a complex and variable pattern responds best to the reality of 
contemporary governance and is a more accurate representation of 
decentralisation than either central state steering or identity-based 
mobilisation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The fieldwork upon which this article is based was carried out in a series of funded 
research projects from 1994 onwards. A small number of elite interviews (10) in 2004 
and 2005 formed part of the ‘Governing and Governance in France’ project financed by 
the British Academy (LRG-37213).  I thank the British Academy for its support.  A 
much larger number of interviews  - 75 – and a comparative opinion survey were 
carried out  in 2001-2002 as part of the ‘Devolution and Decentralisation in Wales and 
Brittany’ project, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (Grant 
number L 219 25 2007).  The ESRC also funded an earlier project – ‘Local Policy 
networks in Britain and France’ (Grant number L311253047), which involved around 
100 interviews from 1994-1996. I am indebted to the council for its support. All 
interviewees were guaranteed anonymity and for ethical reasons no interviewee is 
mentioned by name. The following organisations were particularly useful: Association 
DIWAN, Brittany Chamber of Commerce, Brittany Cultural Council, Brittany 
Economic and Social Chamber,  Brittany Regional Council,  Brittany Regional 
Prefecture (SGAR), the DATAR (Paris), the Education ministry (in Paris, Brittany, 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais), Euralille mixed economy society, Ille-et-Vilaine département, 
Ille-et-Vilaine prefecture, the Industry ministry (DRIRE) in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and 
Brittany; the Infrastructure ministry (in Paris, Nord), the Interior ministry (in Paris), the 
Labour and Training ministry (in Brittany), Lille Métropole Urban Development 
Agency (ADUML), the mayors and/or adjoints of Acigné,  Carhaix,  Cesson-Sevigné, 
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la Chapelle des Fougeretz, Chateaugiron, Fâches-Thumesnil,  Lorient, Lambersart,  
Lille, Nantes, Rennes, Roubaix, Saint Grégoire, St Jacques, Tourcoing, Wasquehal and 
Wavrin; National Assembly, Nord  département prefecture;  Nord département; 
Nord/Pas-de-Calais Regional Council; Nord/Pas-de-Calais Regional prefecture;  Pays 
de la Loire Regional Council,  Research and Technology directorate (DRRT) in 
Brittany and Nord/Pas-de-Calais, SEMAEB (Brittany),  Senate and the Youth and 
Sports ministry (in Brittany). 
 
 
2
  Syndicat intercommunal à vocation unique 
3
  Syndicat  intercommunal à vocation multiple 
4
  Établissement public de coopération intercommunale 
5
 Interviews in the DATAR, 2005,  the Interior ministry, 2005, and the Infrastructure ministry (Paris), 
2004.  
6
 Interviews in the DRIRE, 1995 and the Infrastructure ministry (Nord department), 1995 
7
 Interview in the DATAR, 2005 
8
  Interviews in the Infrastructure ministry (Lille and Paris), 1995, 2004 
9
 The University 2000 programme during  the 1990s was a particular case in point. Across France, local 
and regional authorities built new universities in partnership with the central state.  Ambitious regions, 
such as those in Nord/Pas-de-Calais and Brittany, enthusiastically participated, viewing the process in 
terms of instituional legitimisation. 
10
  In Nord/Pas-de-Calais, a number of interviewees complained that the 1994-1999 State-Region plan 
was used to force the regional council to invest in road-building programmes, though they have no 
legal responsibility for roads.  In Brittany,  on the other hand, the regional council itself insisted that the 
road building programme should be the main priority of the plan.  
11
 A theme emphasised in interviews in the Education ministry (Paris) in 1999 and 2004. 
12
 In the 1994-1999 round, for example, the Brittany regional council refused to agree to the State’s 
demand that it co-finance old-age people’s homes, which did not fall within its competencies 
(interview).  Ambitious regional councils can pressurise the State to contractualise in areas it had not 
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envisaged, such as the example of roads given above. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, in 1994 the Nord 
departmental council quite simply refused to participate in the State-Region planning process. 
13
 Reported in Le Monde, 13 December 2002. 
14
 Notably in the Brittany regional council majority, then governed by the UMP. 
15
 These themes were repeated  often in interviews in 1994-95 and 2001-2. 
16
 Interviews in ADUML,  Rennes-Métropole, SEMAEB and Nord-Pas-de-Calais développement. 
17
 Interviews in SEMAEB, SEM Euralille 
18
 Interviews in the SGAR in Brittany (1995) and Nord/Pas-de-Calais (1994) 
19
 Interviews in the Bretagne/Pays de la Loire European Office, Brussels, 2004. 
20
  One interlocutor referred at length to the informal linkages between Breton local authorities and 
well-placed Bretons within the Commission, praising the helpful role of Commission officials in the 
preparing urban dossiers. 
21
 The census does not collect information on how many people speak languages others than French, 
which, in article 2 of the French constitution, is the only language of the Republic. 
22
 First an independent monarchy (845-938), then a Duchy (from 938 to 1532), then a French province 
with special prerogatives (1532-1789), reduced for long to being a collection of disparate départements 
before becoming an administrative (1972) then political region (1982), modern Brittany is a French 
region with a difference 
23
 . The term ‘region’, as applied to Brittany,  is ambiguous as it can refer to both the institution 
embodied in the current regional council with its four departments (Côtes-d’Armor, Finistère, Ille-et-
Vilaine and Morbihan) and to the geographically wider historic ‘region’, including the Loire Atlantique 
département, corresponding more or less to the ancient Duchy of Brittany. The survey to which this 
article refers was carried out in the area covered by the existing region, known sometimes as B4. 
24
  Efficience 3 interviewed a representative sample of 1007 individuals, selected by quotas of age, 
gender, socio-economic group and locality. Interviews were by telephone, using the CATI method. The 
dataset produced by the survey consists of 1007 cases and 60 variables (Cole, 2004).  The dataset is 
divided into socio-demographic and attitudinal variables.   The socio-demographic variables are those 
of region, locality, gender, occupation of the chief income earner, level of education, country of birth, 
intended vote in a general (parliamentary) election, intended vote in a Regional Council election;  
working status; time spent in Brittany; age; marital status; children in full time education  and level of 
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interest in politics.  Most of the survey material is in the form of detailed analysis of attitudinal and 
opinion variables on matters relating to decentralisation, Breton identity and attitudes (preferences) 
towards issues of the Breton language, education and training.  The principal attitudinal questions 
investigate views on decentralisation in Brittany; the ‘Moreno’ identity scale; the Loire-Atlantique and 
the administrative region of Brittany, views on the performance of  the Brittany Regional Council; 
future expenditure priorities; preferences for regional political institutions; relations between the 
Brittany Regional Council and similar bodies elsewhere in Europe; understanding of the Breton 
language; views on the Breton language; public policy and the Breton language; decision-making 
arenas and the Breton language; Breton language in schools;  attendance at a training course in the past 
24 months; priorities for spending money on training in Brittany; decision-making arenas and training 
in Brittany;  priorities for improving the training of young people and attitudes towards the importance 
of qualifications against employment aged 16 and above. 
 
25
  The ‘As Breton as French’  group, which  represented 57 per cent of respondents, divided its 
preferences as follows: ‘retain  the existing regional council’ (42.2 per cent);  ‘give the regional council 
law-making and tax varying powers’ (36.4 per cent);  an independent Brittany (10.1 per cent), don’t 
know (9 per cent) and abolish the regional council (2.3 per cent). 
26
 The data are based on 1007 individuals in Brittany aged 16 and above. Interviews were carried out in 
June 2001. The survey was divided roughly into four parts, corresponding to our research questions: 
namely, attitudes to political institutions, to language, to education and training issues, as well as socio-
demographic characteristics. For the purposes of establishing relationships, we recoded our data to 
develop multivariate models of institutional preference. We ran logistic regression to explain individual 
support for each of the possible institutional situations.  In Brittany, we extrapolated four different 
dependent variables from our institutional scale.  We coded these  as : 1. ‘ independent Brittany’, 0 
‘others’ (“independence” column in table); 1 ‘Regional Council with law making and taxation powers’, 
0 ‘others’ (“Regional Council with extended competencies” column); 1 ‘Regional Council with limited 
law-making and taxation powers’, 0 ‘others’ (“Regional Council with limited competencies” column);  
‘no regional Council’, 0 ‘others’ (“No Regional Council” column). We selected the independent 
variables of age (3 ’16-24 years’, 2 ’25-44 years’, 1 ’45 years and more’), gender (0 ‘male’, 1 
‘female’), education (1 ‘lowest or no degree’ to 6 ‘upper degree’), place of birth (0 ‘other’, 1 
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‘Brittany’), identity (1 ‘Breton not French’, 2 ‘More Breton than French’, 3 ‘equally Breton and 
French’, 4 ‘More French than Breton’, 5 ‘French not Breton’), language (0 ‘not Breton speaker’, 1 
‘Breton speaker’), level of decision for language and training  (0 ‘other’, 1 ‘Brittany’) and  voting 
behaviour (1 ‘UDF’, 2 ‘Socialist party’, 3 ‘RPR’, 4 ‘Regionalist party’).  
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   In the case of Brittany, support for the independence option was strongly correlated with age, 
gender, education and, to a lesser extent, place of birth. The youngest Bretons, especially those born in 
Brittany, the most educated people and women were the most inclined to support independence. 
